The U.S. Military derives it's super power status not only from it's size and technology, but also from it's standardized systems and operations, including leadership training.
Like the Roman legions a soldier, sailor or officer could/can move between Legions/Brigades and fit right in from day one.
That is the result of standardized training to the some of the highest standards in the world.
The technology does not have to be the best, nor the training standards the best, but if all aspects of technology, training and size are at or near the best and the largest, that is what maintains super power status.
U.S. Military Disarmament - from Financial Incompetance
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U.S. Military Disarmament - from Financial Incompetance
Last edited by Reality Check on Sun Jan 20, 2013 1:28 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: U.S. Military Disarmament - from Financial Incompetance
U.S. Military superiority is rooted in having large numbers of certain types of capital assets that are manned by even larger numbers of highly trained and motivated individuals.
These key assets include certain ships, boats and airplanes and other less common types of assets.
In today's World large numbers of those assets and the even larger numbers of the highly trained individuals needed to operate them are unique to the United States.
For the U.S. Military the skills needed to operate these unique assets are easily trained because the U.S. has been operating such assets for decades.
But the technological infrastructure required to train individuals in key skills is expensive and the U.S. Defense Department has for years been consolidating bases and down sizing training capacities of all types.
Competent political and military leaders would have identified the key, relatively inexpensive infrastructure needed to retain adequate number of personnel with these unique skill sets and ensure that infrastructure was not only adequate, but had extra capacity.
That leadership competency among the political and/or military leaders has apparently been missing for some years now and key training capabilities of the U.S. Military have been unintentionally downsized due to unexpected long term loss of capacity.
These key assets include certain ships, boats and airplanes and other less common types of assets.
In today's World large numbers of those assets and the even larger numbers of the highly trained individuals needed to operate them are unique to the United States.
For the U.S. Military the skills needed to operate these unique assets are easily trained because the U.S. has been operating such assets for decades.
But the technological infrastructure required to train individuals in key skills is expensive and the U.S. Defense Department has for years been consolidating bases and down sizing training capacities of all types.
Competent political and military leaders would have identified the key, relatively inexpensive infrastructure needed to retain adequate number of personnel with these unique skill sets and ensure that infrastructure was not only adequate, but had extra capacity.
That leadership competency among the political and/or military leaders has apparently been missing for some years now and key training capabilities of the U.S. Military have been unintentionally downsized due to unexpected long term loss of capacity.
Last edited by Reality Check on Sun Jan 20, 2013 2:56 pm, edited 2 times in total.
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- Posts: 1441
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2011 6:07 pm
Re: U.S. Military Disarmament - from Financial Incompetance
Base closing and training consolidations have resulted in the minimum and maximum training capacities needed to maintain the status queue being the same.
While such "perfect sizing" of critical path training is questionable by itself, even in the private corporate world, the problem has been compounded by even worse financial decisions.
Key training also involves some of the most expensive training infrastructure in the Military.
In the name of reducing "on paper" budget deficits, replacement of those those key training facilities was delayed for decades and instead a plan to inexpensively "refurbish" very old facilities to extend their life was implemented. Replacement of key infrastructure was moved outside the ten year budget window to make the ten year budget deficit appear less than it would be with realistic budgeting.
Since all the remaining facilities after training consolidation were required to operate at 100% to maintain planned military operating levels taking them out of service for refurbishment resulted in operating below the minimum required 100%. Since 100% capacity was also the minimum operating training tempo required to maintain minimum required manning, the minimum and maximum capacities were the same.
When some of the key facilities failed to return to 100% of capacity after refurbishment and other facilities failed because they simply broke before the refurbishment began the Military finds itself in the position of having between 25% and 50% of the capacity it needs to maintain the minimum manning of key capital assets in the United States military over the next 10 years.
There are no easy fixes to these problems. All fixes require years to implement in addition to immediate and ongoing substantial budgetary increases.
As a result a number of key capital assets are likely to be eliminated from the military of the United States not due to policy, but simply because the United States can not continue to man them over the next ten years unless something changes, and the policy makers do not wish to move the required costs of facility replacement from outside the 10 year budget window, into the next few years.
While such "perfect sizing" of critical path training is questionable by itself, even in the private corporate world, the problem has been compounded by even worse financial decisions.
Key training also involves some of the most expensive training infrastructure in the Military.
In the name of reducing "on paper" budget deficits, replacement of those those key training facilities was delayed for decades and instead a plan to inexpensively "refurbish" very old facilities to extend their life was implemented. Replacement of key infrastructure was moved outside the ten year budget window to make the ten year budget deficit appear less than it would be with realistic budgeting.
Since all the remaining facilities after training consolidation were required to operate at 100% to maintain planned military operating levels taking them out of service for refurbishment resulted in operating below the minimum required 100%. Since 100% capacity was also the minimum operating training tempo required to maintain minimum required manning, the minimum and maximum capacities were the same.
When some of the key facilities failed to return to 100% of capacity after refurbishment and other facilities failed because they simply broke before the refurbishment began the Military finds itself in the position of having between 25% and 50% of the capacity it needs to maintain the minimum manning of key capital assets in the United States military over the next 10 years.
There are no easy fixes to these problems. All fixes require years to implement in addition to immediate and ongoing substantial budgetary increases.
As a result a number of key capital assets are likely to be eliminated from the military of the United States not due to policy, but simply because the United States can not continue to man them over the next ten years unless something changes, and the policy makers do not wish to move the required costs of facility replacement from outside the 10 year budget window, into the next few years.
Re: U.S. Military Disarmament - from Financial Incompetance
I like it very much thanks for sharing this information with us….
maria
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