Re: Generational Dynamics World View News
Posted: Tue Dec 01, 2020 12:51 pm
Generational theory, international history and current events
http://www.gdxforum.com/forum/
What's funny is that I read that article last week. He says similar things to gen-dyn, but then just gives a blanket "2020s are going to be bad".John wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 5:55 am** 01-Dec-2020 World View: Peter Turchin
Peter Turchin hates Generational Dynamics. If you suggest that he'sJCP wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 1:20 am> https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar ... re/616993/
> "The Next Decade Could Be Even Worse
> A historian believes he has discovered iron laws that predict the
> rise and fall of societies. He has bad news."
> This guy seems to be copying you, John.
copying me, he might send someone out to cancel you.
Turchin says the main problem is overproduction of elites - too many wannabe elites for the roles available, leading to infighting amongst the elites.John wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 5:55 am** 01-Dec-2020 World View: Peter Turchin
Peter Turchin hates Generational Dynamics. If you suggest that he'sJCP wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 1:20 am> https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar ... re/616993/
> "The Next Decade Could Be Even Worse
> A historian believes he has discovered iron laws that predict the
> rise and fall of societies. He has bad news."
> This guy seems to be copying you, John.
copying me, he might send someone out to cancel you.
I 100% agree with that statement. And that is exactly why I refuse to recognize the current political divide as being "globalist vs. nationalist" in nature. What's really going on (in my humble opinion) is that the powers that be are turning against each other and adopting nationalistic tendencies as a means rather than an end.Higgenbotham wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 2:11 pmTurchin says the main problem is overproduction of elites - too many wannabe elites for the roles available, leading to infighting amongst the elites.
It was hyperbole. I'm sure he wouldn't hurt a flea.Cool Breeze wrote: ↑Tue Dec 01, 2020 2:01 pm> Why would you say he's going to cancel anyone, though, John?
>
Galbraith's remarks apply equally today. People who are benefiting> "Chapter 11 - Something should be Done?
> Purely in retrospect it is easy to see how 1929 was destined to be
> a year to remember. This was not because Mr. Hoover was soon to
> become President and had inimical intentions toward the market.
> Those intentions developed at least partly in retrospect. Nor was
> it because men of wisdom could tell that a depression was overdue.
> No one, wise or unwise, knew or now knows when depressions are due
> or overdue.
> Rather, it was simply that a roaring boom was in progress in the
> stock market and, like all booms, it had to end. On the first of
> January of 1929, as a simple matter of probability, it was most
> likely that the boom would end before the year was out, with a
> diminishing chance that it would end in any given year thereafter.
> When prices stopped rising -- when the supply of people who were
> buying for an increase was exhausted -- then ownership on margin
> would become meaningless and everyone would want to sell. The
> market wouldn't level out; it would fall precipitately.
> All this being so, the position of the people who had at least
> nominal responsibility for what was going on was a complex one.
> One of the oldest puzzles of politics is who is to regulate the
> regulators. But an equally baffling problem, which has never
> received the attention it deserves, is who is to make wise those
> who are required to have wisdom.
> Some of those in positions of authority wanted the boom to
> continue. They were making money out of it, and they may have had
> an intimation of personal disaster which awaited them when the
> boom came to an end. But there were also some who saw, however
> dimly, that a wild speculation was in progress and that something
> should be done. For these people, however, every proposal to act
> raised the same intractable problem. The consequences of
> successful action seemed almost as terrible as the consequences of
> inaction, and they could be more horrible for those who took the
> action.
> A bubble can easily be punctured. But to incise it with a needle
> so that it subsides gradually is a task of no small delicacy.
> Among those who sensed what was happening in early 1929, there was
> some hope but no confidence that the boom could be made to
> subside. The real choice was between an immediate and
> deliberately engineered collapse and a more serious disaster later
> on. Someone would certainly be blamed for the ultimate collapse
> when it came. There was no question whatever as to who would be
> blamed should the boom be deliberately deflated. (For nearly a
> decade the Federal Reserve authorities had been denying their
> responsibility for the deflation of 1920-21.) The eventual
> disaster also had the inestimable advantage of allowing a few more
> days, weeks, months of life. One may doubt if at any time in
> early 1929 the problem was ever framed in terms of quite such
> stark alternatives. But however disguised or evaded, these were
> the choices which haunted every serious conference on what to do
> about the market."