Generational Dynamics Forum - New Site

December 12, 2025
Interview With Lude

“Overt deployment of troops is a straightforward operation; deployment before it becomes manifest is a surprise operation. If we mount a surprise operation and the enemy does not respond to it, the victory is ours. An excess of surprise operations, however, will overshoot the mark of victory.”

Sun Pin

It has been a long time since I interviewed Mr. Wang of Lude Media. Given Russia’s latest moves, and the emerging crisis in the Caribbean, I thought it was time to take a sounding of Mr. Wang.

JRN: Russia has been making preparations against NATO in the West, with the movement of troops from the Russian Far East to Kaliningrad, and indications that Chinese military officers and staff moved to the Kaliningrad headquarters. What is China’s role in the midst of these preparations?

LUDE: There is no doubt that China and Russia are together and are enemies of the free world. The United States is trying to split this alliance of Russia and China. But the possibility of Russia waging war against Europe is relatively low because Russia is trying to win over the Trump administration. They have no reason to miss that opportunity, since the U.S. is the stronger country.

JRN: Intelligence indicates that Russia is planning large mobilizations, on the order of millions, next year. Do you expect China to begin a large-scale mobilization in 2026?

LUDE: The CCP has already begun a mobilization in 2022, but the details of this mobilization and military spending have been kept secret. China’s military industry has been ramping up for a long time, especially in the northwest [at secret test facilities].

JRN: Do you know of large numbers of troop call-ups planned by China for next year?

LUDE: The CCP operates differently, because training and troops costs are relatively low. This kind of large-scale training is happening every year.

JRN: So they are not training more people for war every year?

LUDE: The number of regional military training personnel is a large number. China already has a vast system of military training. Military preparation is at a high level now.

JRN: How many new recruits are training each year in China?

LUDE: Including the internal army, the total number should be 3-5 million troops trained every year.

JRN: How many troops are available for service in China?

LUDE: They had 100 million to mobilize in the 1970s, but in the 1980s this went down. Currently the internal army office, which is like the National Guard in the U.S., can deploy an extremely large number.

JRN: Could China mobilize 100 million men now?

LUDE: 100 million is the militia, which is something that can be compared with North Korea. When the war really comes, they do not need to draft people. They can use these registered militia for any number of military purposes. It is a different system. These are not trained soldiers, in most cases. The point is that if you just compare the number, in terms of professional military, highly trained may only be around a million.

JRN: With 3-5 million trained every year, that creates a large pool of semi-trained personnel after a decade. How long do new recruits remain in service after training? Who gets selected for intensive training?

LUDE: They typically serve for two years, with a low salary or no salary. It is mandatory for many people. After two years you can become a professional volunteer personnel. Their service is 5-10 years, and have regular salary.

JRN: So what do you estimate is the real size of the Chinese military today?

LUDE: If you are talking about military personnel of high professional status, those people would be around one million.

JRN: China’s military allegedly has 2.8 million soldiers, plus reserves totaling another 3 million. Do you think the real number is higher. If there is an ongoing mobilization why isn’t this number higher? Are we mistaken in this number?

LUDE: Their primary increase has been in the Navy and Air Force, so the real increase is in the number of highly specialized personnel.

JRN: So the real buildup is in the highly trained people?

LUDE: You understand this right. They do not care about total number. What concerns them is the total number of specialists, experts. Even for that, our information shows that this number is increasing. Training these experts is very hard.

JRN: We keep hearing the year 2027 coming up in terms of a coming war. Higher authorities in the West are getting ready. Do you think China’s mobilization will be completed in 2027?

LUDE: My understanding is that 2027 is likely an early time for Xi to act. But Xi may act before this time, related to Taiwan, because if Xi fails to act before that time he may lose the opportunity to act against Taiwan. The CCP is trying everything it can to entangle Russia in an alliance. China wants Asia and a European war to start about the same time. It is very hard to predict what Russia is going to choose in the last moment.

JRN: You once said that the war in Ukraine was planned to last five years. Next year begins the fifth year of the war. This fifth year will be completed in 2027. What do you see happening in Ukraine during the next 14 months? How is this war going to end? What do your sources say?

LUDE: Russia is behaving like the Vikings. Once the Ukraine War ends, they will move on to the next battlefield. There will be continuous negotiations until Russia finds a way to shift from one front to another front. It is going to be hard to stop the war in Ukraine. Russia has become war driven.

JRN: Does this mean Russia cannot stop fighting, and is committed to a further westward movement? So that Russia must attack Europe?

LUDE: The current war is driven by Russia’s original interest. If Russia faces another conflict in 2027, with a global focus, like Taiwan, then the original focus will be compromised. Russia and the United States are negotiating over global interests. By 2027 if the focus shifts to the South China Sea, Russia’s strategic importance will become more apparent. In that case, the Ukraine conflict can be settled.

JRN: The United States has built up a force in the Caribbean to attack Venezuela. Cuba says it will stand by Venezuela. There are Chinese and Russian troops in Venezuela. What is the CCP position on Venezuela? Will China defend Venezuela?

LUDE: The CCP does not dare take any action. Venezuela is too far away. Venezuela is also a disposable pawn. But, turning Venezuela into a terrorism center even after the U.S. defeats Maduro, is a workable strategy. In this way a long-term struggle can take place. It should be noted that whole population mobilization is difficult to do in a South American country. China can buy people through corruption, which is the level for helping Venezuela. Actual military support is hard.

JRN: You have previously said that the CCP is infiltrating 250,000 PLA troops into the United States. Is this plan continuing, or has it been abandoned?

LUDE: The crackdown on the southern border has weakened the CCP’s infiltration. American authorities have also targeted CCP students. This plays an important role. It is an ongoing cat and mouse game. On the one side, infiltration is getting more difficult. But it still continues. I think it is only a matter of time [before they complete their deployment].

JRN: What is the state of the Chinese economy at this time? Are they still having serious economic troubles?

LUDE: The Chinese economy is performing poorly now. Domestic demand cannot recover. The trade agreement increased a tariff which was a heavy blow to Chinese exports. The Chinese real estate sector has completely collapsed. But Xi is turning the focus to the military industrial sector. Those export-orienting factories are redirected to the military sector. As a consequence, unemployment is very high. Twenty percent. Workers are getting $300-$500 a month at jobs that are hard to find. This shows how tight things are getting there.

JRN: Are the Chinese banks near collapse?

LUDE: I would like to clarify that we cannot understand the CCP banks as we understand Western banks. They operate within an authoritarian framework. The banking system is not really connected to the real economy. The banks will not fail until the CCP loses power.

JRN: Have Chinese lost savings in the banks from inflation or lack of access to their accounts?

LUDE: Only deposits of domestic currency in banks is possible. The state controls this currency and can print as much as they want. Even their exchange rate is manipulated. Even now, the new situation is that if you want to use dollars it is under tight control. Conversion to dollars is highly controlled. But within the Renminbi system, it is not a problem. So inflation can be controlled. China is a like a casino that can print plastic chips. But converting these chips into real money is problematic.

JRN: Do you think the Chinese economic system is designed to restrict domestic consumption in order to raise military production? Is it, in reality, a system of rationing for the sake of military procurement?

LUDE: You are absolutely right. This system is designed for low operator cost and low civilian consumption so that redirection to military consumption is easier.

JRN: How much has official corruption and embezzlement contributed China’s economic woes?

LUDE: The wealth gap is enormous, so that one percent of the officials can steal while millions of others do not have enough to boost their consumption.

JRN: Some Western observers are speculating that Xi has become a figurehead, with a troika led by a People’s Liberation Army general in charge. Do you credit these rumors?

LUDE: This rumor is absolutely fake. This is clearly deliberate disinformation released by the political leadership. The CCP is designed to prevent Army control of the political system. One hundred percent false. No way this is true.

JRN: But Xi Jinping’s top appointees, in the Navy and rocket forces have been removed. How do you explain this?

LUDE: First, it is very hard to know if this is truly a purge or fabricated. It is very hard to confirm such purges. The rocket forces and navy people removed are not the professional ones who cannot be replaced. It is impossible for military officers to rebel at once. According to my information, Xi Jinping operates with two parallel systems. One is the transparent system, the other is a secret military system which is hidden and far harder to understand. It is like having a set of falsified accounts to hide the real accounts. This is very hard to confirm.

JRN: Does Xi Jinping have any political accountability, especially if his appointees prove to be inefficient or corrupt?

LUDE: Only those who are politically distrusted will be purged. Back in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, the CCP was extremely skilled at deceptions regarding the status of armies and their leaders.

JRN: Returning to military subjects. China has been building up forces opposite Japan in the Yellow Sea. Do you see China putting military pressure on Japan?

LUDE: The CCP’s military has been active in the Japanese direction. They have been preparing public narratives for a future war against Japan. Whether they would dare to take action is hard to estimate. But we see they are doing the ground work.

JRN: Has the CCP opinion of Trump changed? Earlier this year they thought he could be manipulated. What do they think now?

LUDE: Xi still believes Trump can be manipulated. But the people around Trump, especially Marco Rubio, are considered very difficult to manipulate. Right now it looks like Xi cannot exert enough influence on Trump to get control. It looks like the system for manipulating Trump has been dismantled. Xi tries to manipulate Trump through people near to Trump. But those people have not had enough influence. Marco Rubio has prevented this.

JRN: How does this play out, exactly.

LUDE: Elon Musk and others were influencing Trump from the Chinese side. Currently the Rubio side is winning. Stephen A. Schwarzman of Blackstone, Inc., for example, has great influence on Trump because Trump is always in need of money. At the same time this guy has tight relationship with CCP.

JRN: Trump seems to be positive about the U.S./China relationship. Would you say that the American leadership is still naïve about China’s intentions? Or do they understand what China is doing?

LUDE: The American business community does not understand China’s intentions. The U.S. national security sector understand the threat from China.

JRN: So there is a disconnect in the U.S. between the business community and the national security community?

LUDE: Yes. U.S. businessmen are still blaming those who speak of a Chinese threat as troublemakers. Anyone who speaks of a Chinese threat is said to be disrupting the U.S-China relationship. China Hawks wear a badge of shame, said one businessman. These people are under the trap of the CCP. They are economically tied with the CCP. We do not know how much of Blackstone’s money is CCP’s money, for example. This is a dangerous situation.

JRN: I am told by observers in Canada that Canada is so heavily influenced by Chinese money that it has been politically captured. Do you think this is an exaggeration?

LUDE: The CCP has essentially taken over Toronto, transitioning to CCP control. Other provinces have influence to varying degrees. The political and financial centers are definitely influenced.

JRN: As my last question. MAGA pundits like Steve Bannon talk about splitting Russia from China. Is this nonsense talk?

LUDE: Secretary of State Rubio’s strategy is to pull Russia away from China. This seems to be America’s geopolitical plan.

JRN: What do you think of this plan? Can it succeed?

LUDE: This is a critical moment in history. Russia aligned with America in the Second World War. In the end, Russia has a yellow plan. This is aiming to absorb the Chinese northeast. This has been Russia’s plan for a long time. It is the plan the CCP fears the most. Do a google search for Yellow Russia Plan.

JRN: The Yellow Plan existed only under the tsars, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I see no evidence that Moscow has returned to that plan. Do you really think America can pull Russia away from China?

LUDE: Yes. It is possible for the U.S. to pull Russia out of its alliance with China.

JRN: So Russia might suddenly its military buildup to the east if it makes a deal with the West?

LUDE: Yes. Remember. For the Ukraine War to stop, you need another conflict to start so that Russia can make use of its war economy. Imagine the benefits Russia could get by doing this?

JRN: Thank you for these answers.

UK lacks plan to defend itself from invasion, MPs warn

The UK lacks a plan to defend itself and overseas territories from a military attack, a report by MPs has found.

In a highly critical assessment, the defence committee said the UK is "nowhere near" where it needs to be to defend itself and allies, especially at a time when security threats to Europe are "significant".

The report found that the UK is failing to meet its Nato obligations, and falling "far short of its claimed leadership position".

The report was published as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) identified prospective locations for six new munitions factories, part of a strategy to ramp up domestic defence production.

China’s shadow navy trains to take Taiwan

China is mobilizing an armada of civilian ships that could help in an invasion of Taiwan – a mission that could surpass the Second World War’s Normandy landings. Reuters used ship tracking data and satellite images to monitor the role civilian vessels played in Chinese maritime exercises this summer. The drills revealed that China is devising concrete invasion plans, naval warfare experts say, and rehearsing new techniques aimed at speeding up beach landings of troops and equipment in a bid to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenders.

What Would Happen If America Found Russian Nukes in Venezuela? - Leaked intelligence reveals Russia has secretly moved nuclear-capable weapons to Venezuela — just a few thousand kilometers from the U.S. mainland. This shocking move recalls the Cold War and signals Moscow’s intent to challenge Washington in its own backyard. Could this mark the start of a new nuclear standoff? Watch the full video to uncover the truth behind Russia’s bold escalation.

Military News is reporting that Russia has moved nuclear weapons into Venezuela. Of course, millions of patriotic Americans are not likely to notice or care. And the U.S. Government may not take notice as well. After all, patriotic Americans (and the U.S. Government) are distracted by internal conflicts, especially with each other.

Under a plutocratic system, where American money is heavily invested in China, for example, the will to declare war is undermined. It seems that our type of society must await a crushing blow from its existential adversaries before the people and their dismal leaders awaken to the fact that they have enemies. Yet, even in a system with a retarded political sense and decrepit willpower, war will nonetheless be declared (eventually). Even if the President and the Congress were wiped out by nuclear strikes, a new political body would arise, similar in form to the Continental Congress of 1776.

Trump says he may send Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine

US President Donald Trump is considering sending long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine.

Asked by reporters on Air Force One on Sunday whether he would provide Kyiv with Tomahawks, Trump replied: "We'll see... I may". The missiles would be "a new step of aggression" in Ukraine's war with Russia, he said.

The comments follow a phone call at the weekend between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who pushed for stronger military support to launch counter-attacks against Russia.

Zelensky has said he will meet Trump in Washington on Friday for talks that will focus on air defence and long-range capabilities.


Trump confirmed the Ukrainian leader's visit to the White House when a reporter asked if he plans to host Zelensky on Friday.

"I think so, yeah," the US president said during a brief fuel stop as he travelled back to Washington from the Middle East.

It will be Zelensky's third visit to Washington since January.

Moscow has previously warned Washington against providing long-range missiles to Kyiv, saying it would cause a major escalation in the conflict and strain US-Russian relations.

Tomahawk missiles have a range of 2,500 km (1,500 miles), which would put Moscow within reach of Ukraine.

Trump's attitude to Russia has hardened in recent months as he has become impatient with Vladimir Putin's lack of cooperation in reaching a ceasefire deal with Kyiv.

"I might tell them [Russia] that if the war is not settled, that we may very well, [send Tomahawks to Kyiv] we may not, but we may do it," he said.

"Do they [Russia] want Tomahawks going in their direction? I don't think so," the US president added.

On Sunday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the topic of Tomahawks was of "extreme concern" to Russia. "Now is really a very dramatic moment in terms of the fact that tensions are escalating from all sides," he said.

In September Peskov had dismissed the threat of Tomahawks, saying they would not be able to "change the dynamic" of the war.

But in his comments on Sunday he noted that if Tomahawks were launched at Russia Moscow would not be able to tell whether they were carrying nuclear warheads.

"What should the Russian Federation think? Just how should Russia react?", he said.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev then doubled down on Peskov's comments.

"How should Russia respond? Exactly!" Medvedev said on social media.

"The delivery of these missiles could end badly for everyone. And first of all – for Trump himself," he wrote.

Medvedev, who over the last few years has grown into an increasingly hawkish figure, frequently posts on social media espousing more extreme positions than the Kremlin's.

He and Trump have sparred online before. Comments by Medvedev in August led Trump to say he had ordered two nuclear submarines to move closer to Russia.

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, Kyiv has made multiple requests for long-range missiles, as it weighs up striking Russian cities far from the front lines of the grinding conflict.

How Russia is Helping China Prepare to Seize Taiwan

Russia has agreed to equip and train the PLA to air-drop armoured vehicles and special reconnaissance capabilities.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to militarily seize Taiwan by 2027. A large-scale amphibious operation is highly risky, with the sites suitable for landing craft to deliver troops and equipment ashore constrained by the gradient and load bearing capacity of the beaches. Seizing airfields could allow troops to flow in by air, but as Russia discovered during its invasion of Ukraine, runways can be quickly denied. The PLA is therefore eager to identify ways of diversifying both the methods and locations at which it can move units onto Taiwan.

Although the areas where Russia surpasses China in military capability are diminishing, Russia has practical experience and capabilities for air manoeuvre that China lacks. According to contracts and correspondence obtained by the Black Moon hacktivist group, Russia agreed in 2023 to supply the PLA with a complete set of weapons and equipment to equip an airborne battalion, as well as other special equipment necessary for airborne infiltration of special forces, along with a full cycle of training for operators and technical personnel to use this equipment. In addition, Russia is transferring technologies that will allow China to scale-up the production of similar weapons and military equipment through localization and modernization.

The approximately 800 pages of contracts and collateral materials appear genuine and details from within the documents have been independently verified. However, there is also the possibility that parts of the documents have been altered or omitted.

The Russian Offer

The agreements provide for the sale by Russia to China of:

37 BMD-4M, light amphibious assault vehicles with a 100 mm gun and 30 mm automatic cannon.
11 Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious anti-tank self-propelled guns with a 125 mm cannon.
11 BTR-MDM ‘Rakushka’ airborne armoured personnel carriers.

Several Rubin command and observation vehicles and KSHM-E command vehicles.
The agreements state that all armoured vehicles must be equipped with Chinese communication and command and control suites, and with verification of their electromagnetic compatibility with Russian electronic equipment. This is due both to the need to maintain interoperability with other Chinese units, and the better technical capabilities of Chinese equipment. The Russians must also prepare the equipment and software for the use of Chinese ammunition.

The agreements also require Russia to train a battalion of Chinese paratroopers in employing the equipment. Armoured vehicle drivers will be trained at the Kurganmashzavod base, and the crews of KMN command and observation vehicles and Sprut anti-tank guns will be trained in Penza at JSC NPP Rubin. After completing courses on training equipment and simulators, the collective training of the Chinese airborne battalion will be carried out at training grounds in China. Here, Russian instructors are to prepare the battalion for landing, fire control and manoeuvring as part of an airborne unit. The Russians are also transferring Rheostat airborne artillery command and observation vehicle and Orlan-10 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicles. A Centre for Technical Maintenance and Repair of Russian Equipment will be established in China, to which all necessary technical documentation will be transferred. This will allow China to undertake the production and modernisation of these capabilities in the future.

The capacity to airdrop armour vehicles on golf courses, or other areas of open and firm ground near Taiwan’s ports and airfields, would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power and threaten seizure of these facilities to clear a path for the landing of follow-on forces
In addition, the agreements provide for the transfer of special-purpose parachute systems ‘Dalnolyot’, which are designed for inserting loads of up to 190 kg from an altitude of up to 32,000 feet, achieving a range of between 30-80 km depending on load. Russia is equipping and training Chinese special forces groups to penetrate the territory of other countries without being noticed, offering offensive options against Taiwan, the Philippines and other island states in the region.

Implications

The operational challenge for the PLA in seizing Taiwan is successfully landing with a sufficient mass of troops and thus enough combat power to be able to establish a lodgement and thereby build up a force that can defeat the Taiwanese military by seizing vital ground before the ROC mobilises. The beaches suitable for landing are limited, known, and dispersed. The runways and ports on the island could be invaluable for reinforcing the lodgement but denying these facilities would likely be a priority task for Taiwanese forces.

If the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, supported in a Joint Firepower Campaign, can successfully suppress Taiwanese air defences, then air manoeuvre offers the fastest means of transferring combat power onto Taiwan, and spreading operations across an expanded area. Helicopters offer the most flexible means of deploying troops, but light infantry, unsupported by armour and fires, will necessarily struggle to hold their objectives against a mechanised adversary, as Russian airborne troops found to their detriment at Hostomel. The capacity to airdrop armour vehicles, therefore, on golf courses, or other areas of open and firm ground near Taiwan’s ports and airfields, would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power and threaten seizure of these facilities to clear a path for the landing of follow-on forces.

It should also be noted that an attempt to seize Taiwan would likely see fighting erupt throughout the South China Sea, creating a requirement for the PLA to project combat power further afield. In the initial phases of war air manoeuvre could allow the PLA to move airborne forces with organic firepower and mobility to critical terrain beyond Taiwan, securing airfields or other infrastructure that could otherwise support US operations to counter the PLA amphibious landings on Taiwan. In short, an expanded air manoeuvre capability gives the PLA a diversity of options for rapid power projection.

The equipment purchased from the Russians is compatible with Russian built Il-76/78 aircraft equipped with PBS-955M/957, MKS-350-14M and APSDG-250 landing and parachute platform equipment, which is used for landing vehicles ‘in a train’. This capability was recently demonstrated by Russian forces during the Zapad military exercise. The agreements provide for sending Russian instructors to train Chinese pilots and crew members in landing in this way on the territory of the PRC.

China already operates air deployable armoured vehicles from its Y-20 transport aircraft, and as of 2025 has fielded a range of new airborne equipment that is comparable to the Russian equipment. Given that an air manoeuvre operation for a battalion of the Russian supplied equipment would require around 35 Il-76s, while the PLAAF operates a fleet of 26 Il-76s, including 10 Il-76s sold to the PRC by the Russians in 2013, it may be asked why the PLA purchased a battalion set of Russian equipment. The fact that the contracts include a battalion’s worth of landing and parachute equipment suggests that the PLA expects to obtain the necessary aircraft, or to insert in multiple phases.

The greatest value of the deal to the PLA, however, is most likely in the training and the procedures for command and control of airborne forces, as Russia’s airborne forces have combat experience, while the PLA does not. The requirement for a battalion’s worth of equipment – with an expanded number of C2 platforms – likely speaks to the desire to conduct battalion scale collective training, and since the Russians are to deliver it, this must be conducted on Russian vehicles.

The deal also reflects the growing military-industrial co-operation between Russia and the PRC over the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the Chinese side, the project is being handled by the Main Directorate for the Development of Armaments and Military Equipment of the Central Military Council with the involvement of representatives of the PLAAF and Airborne Forces Command. The Russian side of the deal is covered by Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary authorized to export military and dual-purpose goods, services, and technologies. But the deal involves participation from a range of Russian defence companies including PJSC Il (manufacturer of the Il-76/78), KBP Instrument Design Bureau (weapon systems), Sozvezdiye, United Instrument Corporation OPK and NIISSU (automatic control and communication systems), Kurganmashzavod and SKBM (armoured vehicles), NPP Rubin (command and surveillance vehicles), MKPK Universal, Technodynamika, and Polyot (parachute and landing systems), as well as 27 Central Research Institutes of the Russian Ministry of Défense. On the Chinese side, the implementation is being handled by state-owned companies AVIC (aviation), CETC (communications and control systems), and NORINCO (armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition).

Historically, Russia has been wary of exporting its areas of military-technical advantage to China out of fears of intellectual property theft. However, Moscow increasingly sees the invasion of Taiwan – and subsequent division of the global economic order into opposing spheres – as a means of building leverage over Beijing by making Russia a supplier of critical raw materials and military industrial capacity. For China, funding to Russian military industrial enterprises contributes to the continuation of fighting in Ukraine, which the PRC supports to fix NATO capacity in the European theatre. Nevertheless, China has hitherto sought to reduce the signature of its overt defence cooperation with Moscow. The question is whether these contracts represent a shift in Beijing’s willingness to deepen direct defence collaboration.

© RUSI, 2025.

The CCP Is Inside the Fed: Shocking New Evidence of Chinese Infiltration at America’s Central Bank

A decade-long infiltration campaign by the Chinese Communist Party has penetrated the Federal Reserve—coercing employees, stealing sensitive data, and compromising America’s financial core.

Most Americans have heard about Chinese spies targeting our military or hacking private companies. But there’s another front in this quiet war, one that’s gone largely unreported—and it may be the most dangerous of all: China’s long game to infiltrate and manipulate the United States Federal Reserve.

A 2022 Senate investigation offered a rare glimpse into this operation, but even that barely scratches the surface. What’s playing out behind closed doors isn’t just a few bureaucratic missteps or naïve collaborations—it’s a full-blown economic espionage campaign.

This is warfare without bullets.

Hard Evidence of Espionage and Infiltration

Here are some documented examples that received little attention from the mainstream media:

1. Detained and Surveilled in China (Individual A)

• In 2019, a Fed employee was detained four separate times by Chinese authorities during a visit to Shanghai. He was threatened, told his family would be harmed, and coerced into handing over sensitive U.S. economic data. Chinese agents accessed his Fed laptop, phones, and internal contact lists. He was ordered to “tell a good story about China” back in the U.S. This employee returned to his post with full access to confidential monetary policy data.

2. Secret Data Transfers to Chinese Institutions (Individual B)

• Another employee sent modeling code and restricted Fed data to a university linked to China’s central bank (PBOC). He proposed deeper collaboration between his Reserve Bank and Chinese state institutions while maintaining access to Class II FOMC data, which includes sensitive internal forecasts and deliberations.

3. Coordination with Chinese Propaganda Outlets (Individual C)

• Another Fed employee took a paid visiting professorship in China funded by the CCP and subsequently acted as a liaison with Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese government’s propaganda arm. He even helped Chinese journalists and officials gain access to Fed contacts, often bypassing formal Fed communication channels.

4. Suspicious Talent Recruitment Programs (Individual D)

• Another Fed employee attempted to transfer large U.S. data sets to Chinese institutions. He was found to have joined the Thousand Talents Program, China’s premier foreign recruitment tool for stealing scientific and economic research. This affiliation was never disclosed and the employee continued working at the Fed.

Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater.

Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner?

This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects.

As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this:

Degrade the adversary’s decision-making.
Weaken the adversary’s will to fight.
Undermine the adversary’s public support for war.
Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within.
Support and enhance deterrence.
The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.

First, China uses advances in nuclear weapons to craft and entrench its strategic narratives throughout the region. Second, nuclear modernization enhances Beijing’s ability to deter, enjoy escalation dominance, and coerce in material and psychological ways that are advantageous for China. Third, Chinese modernization manipulates and degrades trust in US extended nuclear deterrence and deepens allied fears of US abandonment.

More broadly, the report argues that these strategic effects of Chinese nuclear modernization are completely aligned with evolving CCP and PLA notions of strategic stability, strategic deterrence, and strategic capabilities. For China, strategic stability is not simply a stable state in its relations with other great powers. It entails a stability that is advantageous for the advancement of Chinese geopolitical and development objectives. In this sense, a stable but dynamic (rather than static) set of relationships and arrangements allows China to accumulate comprehensive national power in a relative and absolute sense.

For the CCP and PLA, strategic deterrence is not only about deterring an adversary from a specific military course of action or policy. It also involves placing ongoing and enduring military and nonmilitary constraints on an adversary in a manner that is advantageous for the pursuit of China’s broader objectives. Indeed, China’s nuclear weapons do not exist only to deter a nuclear attack. They also exist to shape the military and nonmilitary actions and mindsets of other states to ensure they are conducive to Chinese interests. This includes asymmetric strategic stability and asymmetric strategic deterrence, which shape the actions and mindsets of nations that do not have proportionate strategic capabilities.

The modernizing nuclear arsenal exists to enable China to attack the adversary’s plans (strategies) and allies, bringing China one step closer to subduing the enemy and winning without fighting.

The report then offers case studies of the Chinese stratagem against the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes with the recommendations summarized below:

Abandon the false hope of arms control and embrace ambiguity and strategic instability.
Recognize that there is no need for allies to consider developing their own nuclear weapons. This is a distraction that will play into Chinese hands.
Double down on conventional allied rearmament and underpin it with credible US extended nuclear deterrence.
Engage in psychological warfare with strategic effects.

tim wrote: Sun Jul 20, 2025 10:29 pm https://jrnyquist.blog/2025/07/15/china ... ched-fist/ Only countries like the United States, Canada and Australia have the vast land to serve our need for mass colonization.rm thinking and strategic calculation may prove decisive.