.
The Kiev Government now find's itself deeper in the Military Trap. Some of the problems Kiev finds itself in:
1. Even threatening to use the Armed military forces and Armed police forces of the country of Ukraine against Anti-Keiv Ukrainian citizens in the eastern part of Ukraine leaves the Kiev government open to charges it violated the first requirement of the Geneva letter the Kiev government signed. That requirement being that none of the four signatories to the letter use force to solve the crisis in Ukraine. Now countries wanting some reasonable argument to support Russia in this dispute, have one. Major countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa were already supporting Russia ( actively or passively ) in international diplomatic forums. Even some members of the European Union, all of whom have a veto on EU mandatory sanctions on Russia, might consider using that as an excuse to veto, or water down mandatory EU sanctions on Russia.
2. Professional, Ukrainian, Military forces in all parts of of Ukraine are becoming more likely NOT to follow orders to attack from the Kiev government:
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2014-04- ... hostage#p1Bloomberg Businessweek News, on Wednesday, April 23rd, 2014 wrote:
... it's unclear how much ( military ) capacity Ukraine's interim government in Kiev has against the insurgents.
The Interior Ministry said police forced a group of armed insurgents out of the eastern village of Svyatogorsk on Wednesday, but did not give details of the action other than to say there were no injuries.
A previous operation to reclaimed seized buildings showed few results before it was suspended last week following international talks in Geneva that produced an agreement to de-escalate the crisis. Ukrainian forces claimed to have regained control of one small airport, but insurgents also seized armored vehicles and reports said some Ukrainian soldiers had switched sides.
"Security forces are in a state of disorganization and demoralization," said Kiev-based political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko. "Today, most of them don't want to fight for anyone because they don't know who is going to win tomorrow and how all of this will end."
The army is underfunded and poorly equipped after years of corruption and mismanagement under Viktor Yanukovych, the Russia-friendly president who fled the country in February after months of protests.
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/apr ... t-hostage/
The Kiev government's repeated orders to start and stop "active use of force" against people in some regions of Ukraine makes the armed forces less likely to follow those orders.
3. The professional military units made up of people from all regions and cultural groups of Ukraine are are less likely to attack the Ukrainian rebels in Russian speaking areas of the country than are national guard units and political militia units made up nearly entirely of Ukrainian speaking peoples from Ukrainian speaking regions.
4. The money saving moves made by previous Ukrainian governments to keep military costs down have resulted in Military Units stationed in Russian speaking areas of Ukraine to have enlisted soldiers locally from Russian speaking communities. These military units are least likely to shoot on their own communities and most likely to join the rebels against the Kiev government, if the government starts using force against people in their communities.
5. If Kiev sends it's most loyal national guard, police forces and political militia units from Kiev and Western Ukraine deep into Eastern Ukraine where they are bogged down and cut off from the rest of Ukraine, they will be unavailable to defend against a punishment, disruption, and diversion attack on Kiev by invading Russian forces and could easily result in the loss of the Kiev river bridges to Russian forces carrying out a lightening armored attack across the Eastern European plain to Moldova.
6. The biggest risk of all, is that the Kiev government would commit it's loyal armed forces to an all out assault on anti-Kiev militia's in eastern Ukraine and lose that military campaign without Russian troops ever openly crossing the border. Such a result would virtually destroy the ability of the Kiev government to control the Eastern, Southern or Central regions of Ukraine outside of Kiev.
7. A lesser risk, but one which appears nearly impossible to avoid at this point, is the inability of the Kiev government to dislodge the eastern militias, and the forced rescheduling of the May elections or the total de-legitimizing of elections if they are carried out in May without eastern Ukraine voting.
8. The most likely outcome is probably one where the Kiev government backs down on using major force and the pro-Russian militias slowly consolidate and expand their gains in eastern Ukraine between now and the May election date, with Russia left in the drivers seat to determine if, when and how to disrupt the May elections and or take more regions of Ukraine between now and the scheduled elections in May.