Japan Approaches the Breaking Point
Posted: Tue Jul 13, 2010 6:10 pm
We can see a generational change taking place in Japan.
Japan Approaches the Breaking Point
The fate of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was reversed Sunday when the House of Councillors, the upper house of Japan’s parliament, faced a serious defeat in elections. The loss comes less than one year after the DPJ’s celebrated “regime change” in August 2009, in which it seized power from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for nearly all of the preceding half century.
It is hard to read the election results as anything other than a rebuke to the DPJ. The party ditched its leadership in June after failing on a primary campaign pledge to redefine aspects of its relationship with the United States, and the new leadership — led by Prime Minister Naoto Kan — appeared to emerge with a stride. But the initial failure may have left deeper wounds than first realized. Moreover, Kan’s immediate proposal of ambitious fiscal reforms provoked a negative reaction from a public already worried about global economic uncertainty. He was likened to the infamous Ryutaro Hashimoto, the prime minister who attempted to correct Japan’s public finances too quickly after a recession and was blamed for triggering a relapse. The election defeat appears to be the result of such economic fears.
While the party’s coalition remains in control of the more powerful House of Representatives, it has lost the opportunity to dominate both houses and push its preferred legislation through with minimal resistance. Instead, it faces an emboldened opposition, the possibility of a hung parliament and the inevitability of internal feuding within its party. The DPJ appears to be entering the same whirlpool of short-lived leaders and ceaseless factionalism that it blamed on its predecessors and cited as an example of what it sought to overcome in its quest to revitalize Japan.
Thus, high hopes that the DPJ’s rise to power would instantaneously “revolutionize” Japan — hopes that STRATFOR was quick to dash in 2009 — have now officially flopped. Extended political malaise has been confirmed as the complement to Japan’s two-decades-long economic malaise.
Yet it would be incorrect to say that the country is stagnant. The DPJ’s members are younger and have less political lineage than those of the LDP, and the DPJ remains committed to altering structural defects in the country’s economic and political status quo. Moreover, the surprising success of the upstart Your Party shows that the will to change in Japan is spreading and is by no means limited to one party.
“Extended political malaise has been confirmed as the complement to Japan’s two-decades-long economic malaise.”
This groping for a new path is important to watch. Despite Japan’s apparent immobility on the global stage, it remains an economic and military giant. STRATFOR has frequently reminded readers that Japan’s history and strategic imperatives reveal a distinct pattern in which periods of internal chaos give way to abrupt manifestations of unified purpose and adroit shifts in foreign policy. Japan’s wars with Russia, China, Southeast Asia and the United States over the last century and a half reveal an inherent power to affect the course of global affairs during its periods of extroversion, as well as its several periods of commercial dominance.
The question we continue to pose is: When will the current period of fecklessness end and something new begin? The recent elections suggest that a breaking point has not yet been reached, but another round of indecisiveness can only mean that the inevitable is drawing closer.
Another question is whether Japan’s change will be precipitated by internal factors, external factors or both. Demographic decline is a trend underlying the other problems. It is worth noting that one of the most influential forces contributing to Japan’s current state of affairs — for better and worse — is the economic and military rise of China. If China continues on its current upswing, it will quickly surpass Japan economically and grow in stature as a perceived threat to Japanese security. If China suffers a serious economic slowdown or disruption, which internal Chinese cycles and global economic conditions suggest, it will impact Japan’s economy, raising risks and opportunities. Either scenario — not to mention other possible shocks — could shake Japan out of its drift.
Japan Approaches the Breaking Point
The fate of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was reversed Sunday when the House of Councillors, the upper house of Japan’s parliament, faced a serious defeat in elections. The loss comes less than one year after the DPJ’s celebrated “regime change” in August 2009, in which it seized power from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for nearly all of the preceding half century.
It is hard to read the election results as anything other than a rebuke to the DPJ. The party ditched its leadership in June after failing on a primary campaign pledge to redefine aspects of its relationship with the United States, and the new leadership — led by Prime Minister Naoto Kan — appeared to emerge with a stride. But the initial failure may have left deeper wounds than first realized. Moreover, Kan’s immediate proposal of ambitious fiscal reforms provoked a negative reaction from a public already worried about global economic uncertainty. He was likened to the infamous Ryutaro Hashimoto, the prime minister who attempted to correct Japan’s public finances too quickly after a recession and was blamed for triggering a relapse. The election defeat appears to be the result of such economic fears.
While the party’s coalition remains in control of the more powerful House of Representatives, it has lost the opportunity to dominate both houses and push its preferred legislation through with minimal resistance. Instead, it faces an emboldened opposition, the possibility of a hung parliament and the inevitability of internal feuding within its party. The DPJ appears to be entering the same whirlpool of short-lived leaders and ceaseless factionalism that it blamed on its predecessors and cited as an example of what it sought to overcome in its quest to revitalize Japan.
Thus, high hopes that the DPJ’s rise to power would instantaneously “revolutionize” Japan — hopes that STRATFOR was quick to dash in 2009 — have now officially flopped. Extended political malaise has been confirmed as the complement to Japan’s two-decades-long economic malaise.
Yet it would be incorrect to say that the country is stagnant. The DPJ’s members are younger and have less political lineage than those of the LDP, and the DPJ remains committed to altering structural defects in the country’s economic and political status quo. Moreover, the surprising success of the upstart Your Party shows that the will to change in Japan is spreading and is by no means limited to one party.
“Extended political malaise has been confirmed as the complement to Japan’s two-decades-long economic malaise.”
This groping for a new path is important to watch. Despite Japan’s apparent immobility on the global stage, it remains an economic and military giant. STRATFOR has frequently reminded readers that Japan’s history and strategic imperatives reveal a distinct pattern in which periods of internal chaos give way to abrupt manifestations of unified purpose and adroit shifts in foreign policy. Japan’s wars with Russia, China, Southeast Asia and the United States over the last century and a half reveal an inherent power to affect the course of global affairs during its periods of extroversion, as well as its several periods of commercial dominance.
The question we continue to pose is: When will the current period of fecklessness end and something new begin? The recent elections suggest that a breaking point has not yet been reached, but another round of indecisiveness can only mean that the inevitable is drawing closer.
Another question is whether Japan’s change will be precipitated by internal factors, external factors or both. Demographic decline is a trend underlying the other problems. It is worth noting that one of the most influential forces contributing to Japan’s current state of affairs — for better and worse — is the economic and military rise of China. If China continues on its current upswing, it will quickly surpass Japan economically and grow in stature as a perceived threat to Japanese security. If China suffers a serious economic slowdown or disruption, which internal Chinese cycles and global economic conditions suggest, it will impact Japan’s economy, raising risks and opportunities. Either scenario — not to mention other possible shocks — could shake Japan out of its drift.