Politics is incapable of risk management.
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNUM (number of US Banks Shrinking as if By Design By Big Banks and the US Federal Reserve)
Apparently ZIRP hurts loans and profits by smaller banks.
Notes:
- Social Security total of $2.7 trillion (assets of the combined OASDI Trust Funds in 2011)
- Social Security requires (Over the 75-year period) additional revenue equivalent to $8.6 trillion to pay all scheduled benefits
- Total Medicare spending is projected to increase from $523 billion in 2010 to $932 billion by 2020
- Medicare enrollment From 2010 to 2030 is projected to increase from 47 million to 79 million,
- Medicare ratio of workers to enrollees is expected to decrease from 3.7 to 2.4.[60]
Tort is smothering growth also point blank.
Risk
The Silence of Institutions
Decision seen before answer the question by saying that we should adopt strict liability when due care is insufficient to eliminate accidents. But due care is never sufficient to eliminate accidents, so this theory suggests that strict liability should be adopted across the board in place of the negligence rule in tort law. The reason is that the negligence rule imposes no liability on the actor when he exercises reasonable care, as assumed. Since the negligence rule imposes no liability on the actor when he exercises reasonable care, and since it is assumed that he will exercise reasonable care, liability will not distort his activity level choice away from the socially optimal scale (the scale associated with points A and B)
That external benefit is reflected in the vertical distance between the marginal private benefit schedule and the marginal social benefit schedule. Consider the following unitization rationale. Imagine two firms imposing reciprocal costs of one dollar per month on each other. If the firms merged, would they require a transfer of one dollar, both ways, between the merged units? No, because it would have no effect on the incentives of relevant actors. By the same reasoning, when two actors impose the same costs, imposing strict liability on both would not alter their activity levels from the levels chosen under the negligence rule.
# In the case of reciprocal harms, the unitization argument made suggests that the activity levels chosen under strict liability will be the same as those chosen under negligence. This implies that there is no need to adopt strict liability in place of negligence in the reciprocal harms. The foregoing functions of no-duty rules correct market failures or missing markets. Another function of no-duty rules is to simply permit markets to optimally regulate activity levels. In some instances, we will see below, the imposition of a duty of care (negligence liability) may distort the activity level choice away from the socially optimal level. One setting in which this occurs is where the actors can observe external costs and benefits and take them into account in contracting decisions. When informed actors are aware of potential external costs, and can effectively contract over both the scale of activity and the level of care, imposing liability may distort activity levels by preventing parties from contracting over the care level. Conversely, there are settings where, because of informational asymmetry, imposing negligence liability for a certain type of loss distorts the market. The three functions of no-duty rules are: (1) to provide subsidization; (2) to serve as complements to property rules; and (3) to permit the market to regulate activity levels without distortions created by liability. The first and third functions are quite similar.
Wage arbiters seeking zone debt serfs by fiat and risk aversion.
Forward thinking teams are adapting since they have no choice
in a compression market.
No fear. No distractions. The ability to let that which does not matter truly slide.
Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club, 1996