Presently, there seems to be an unusually wide gap between hindsight and foresight, both in the financial markets and in the economy. In both cases, forward-looking evidence suggests weak outcomes, but recent trends encourage optimism and risk-taking. Rather than sugar-coat these uncertainties and minimize the messy divergences in the data, I think the best approach is to review the evidence, warts and all, including economic risks, market conditions, and the strengths and limitations of our own investment approach.
Last week, Treasury bill yields and 10-year Treasury yields both advanced, compounding the existing exhaustion syndrome with an overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising yields syndrome, and not far from generating another rigidly hostile set of conditions outlined in the July 2007 comment A Who's Who of Awful Times to Invest . The fact that numerous Aunt Minnies are converging here is indicative that market risks are unusually high even if we ignore concurrent economic risks.
Given the convergence of a number of nasty Aunt Minnies here, it's difficult to keep from crossing the line between our usual "on average" language to outright "warning" language - simply because the typical outcomes are ultimately so disproportionately bad. Still, it's important to remember that even these syndromes don't necessarily resolve into immediate risks, and those slight new highs are often so highly celebrated that it's tempting to join the party if the process drags out for any length of time. Even here, it's not entirely certain that market conditions won't shift in a way that allows for some modest amount of market exposure, but at present, we would characterize conditions as very unfavorable for long-term investors, and speculative even for speculators.
http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc120206.htm
Most notable this week is the bulls are screaming ever more loudly and, at the same time, the bears are increasing their warnings.
Hussman doesn't hone in on the generational dangers, though, and I am wondering if the present environment isn't more dangerous than 2007 or the other time periods he cites.
While the market seemed somewhat dangerous early in January, at just 1% off the 2011 peak in the S&P 500 and with many other averages exceeding the 2011 peak, we are looking at 1929 prices in a 1930 economy so to speak. Not exactly, but the comparison is probably at least somewhat relevant.
Hussman talks about the wiiiiiide potential for imprecision in the employment statistics and notes the good weather is leading to a lack of layoffs in construction and other weather related jobs. I noticed today that the unemployment claims were down and the futures market spiked for a bit on the release of the data, then sold off and ended the day below the point at which that data was released. Sometimes when that type of activity is seen, the market is saying, in essence, this is as good as it gets. At least until something that looks better comes along, if it does.
While the periphery breaks down rather slowly at first, the capital cities of the hegemon should collapse suddenly and violently.