Generational Dynamics World View News

[Navigator]

I agree that Putin is "riding the tiger". I think he is not someone who is going to quietly ride off into the sunset. Instead, he will try to go out in a "blaze of glory".

As John points out, things can get out of control quickly when you play the brinkmanship game. All it takes is some subordinate somewhere to push a button in a moment of crisis.

[Cool Breeze]

Until people stop thinking in linear terms and look at human life as cyclical and seasonal we are going to be stuck in a never ending repeating cycle.

This will only happen if and when people stop thinking about "progress" or other tower of babel ideas.

[Cool Breeze]

I agree that Putin is "riding the tiger". I think he is not someone who is going to quietly ride off into the sunset. Instead, he will try to go out in a "blaze of glory".

As John points out, things can get out of control quickly when you play the brinkmanship game. All it takes is some subordinate somewhere to push a button in a moment of crisis.

On a scale of 1-10, where does Russia/Putin stand as a "problem"? China/CCP?

I'm curious how bold you all are in these assertions regarding what I see as Putin hysteria.

[Xeraphim1]

I posted this in another thread, but I think it may be of interest to most:

I am heavily involved with wargaming.

The following article is an in-depth look at what wargames (very complicated ones that have been proven time and again to be very prescient) say about upcoming war with China/Russia.

https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/how-d ... a-wargame/

Here are the key highlights I was sent by a NATO contact doing wargames with European military communities:

Marine Corps War College wargame I organized that allowed students to fight a multiple great state conflict last week. Run at a high level, clearly sponsored and with officers allowed the time to engage, and with an analytical strategic purpose. Also completed within a limited timeframe of a week – so achievable. It incorporates Russia in the Baltics/Ukraine/Poland, China using the opportunity to seize Taiwan and N Korea opportunistically attacking S Korea. A worst-case scenario for NATO and the West but not unrealistic in concept.

The wargames were played by six student teams, or approximately five persons each. There were three red teams, representing Russia, China, and North Korea; combatting three blue teams representing Taiwan, Indo-Pacific Command (Korea conflict) and European Command. Manageable resourcing if the outputs were agreed as adding value to strategic thinking, consideration of capability development and operating at reach with allies. Useful for developing some detailed Red forces thinking too that is based on real world nations rather than fabricated ones that resemble the actual potential adversaries.

Students were given a list of approximately 75 items they could invest in that would give them certain advantages during the game. A fascinating consideration to apply to current and future capability. Interesting that none of the students opted for an additional carrier!

As there was not enough American combat power to fight and win three simultaneous major conflicts, hard strategic choices were unavoidable. The article only really addresses US considerations, although clearly it is a global issue.

The fight in Poland was beyond brutal. By student estimates, the NATO forces lost over 60,000 men and women on the first day (150k in first week) of the fight, Sobering!

These games were designed to help the students think about future conflicts and operational art, and not for serious analytical work. Still, there were several observations that may point the services and Joint Staff toward areas that require more serious analysis. Sets the scope but illustrates that more may be gleaned from it.

The high rate of loss in modern conventional combat challenged student paradigms ingrained by nearly two decades of counter-insurgency operations. For students, who have spent their entire military lives viewing the loss of a squad or a platoon as a military catastrophe, this led to a lot of discussion about what it would take to lead and inspire a force that is burning through multiple brigades a day, as well as a lengthy discussion on how long such combat intensity could be sustained.

To ease the students into the complexity of this wargame, logistics was hugely simplified. Still, much of the post-game discussion focused on the impossibility of the U.S. military’s current infrastructure to support even half the forces in theater or to maintain the intensity of combat implied by the wargame as necessary to achieve victory.

Airpower, the few times it was available, was a decisive advantage on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the planes rarely showed up to assist the ground war, as they prioritized winning dominance of their own domain over any other task. Its about integration in combined and joint operations. Valuable lessons to be drawn from this. Also worth noting is how the very expensive carriers were kept away from threat and would only operate lose to shore when under an overwhelming land based air umbrella.

Neither America nor its allies had any adequate response to the use of chemical weapons by the enemy.

Neither U.S. forces nor allied forces had an answer to counter the overpowering impact of huge enemy fire complexes. I ran a wargame last Feb looking at doctrine and survivability on the modern battlefield set in Estonia against a near-peer enemy. IN both attack and defence, the NATO combat brigades were found by UAVs and written down 50% plus without ever seeing the enemy. They refused to believe the outcomes “because we’re so well trained!” or the “this wouldn’t happen” delusion. We have a lot to learn about near-peer conflict after 20+ years of Iraq and AFG.

Cyber advantages always proved fleeting. Moreover, any cyberattack launched on its own was close to useless.

For those interested, the games used are all part of GMT’s Next War Series, designed by Mitchell Land and Greg Billingsley. I have found these commercial games are far more sophisticated and truer to what we expect future combat to look like than anything being used by most of the Department of Defense’s wargaming community which is often decades behind commercial game publishers when it comes to designing realistic games. In fact, if I was to fault the Next War series for anything, it is that it may be overly realistic and therefore very complex and difficult to master, and time consuming to play.

I read more of the article and the first thing that comes to mind is that the results of any game vary depending on how it is designed and the purpose of the game. One thing in common is making the game interesting. If you continually have a blow out, no one will buy it. With that in mind, I find the results of the Korea game improbable at best. The likelihood of North Korea beginning an invasion before South Korea had time to move forces from the South is quite unlikely. NK has little ability to move men, equipment and supplies into position unseen. It also has little ability to sustain even a limited offensive. One one, it doesn't have the fuel even if it cripples the rest of its economy. The ten days the scenario allows is extremely optimistic. And China entering on NK's side is also highly optimistic; with it already trying to take Taiwan, why would it open up another front to be attacked on and use up valuable equipment and manpower? As for chemical weapons, the US has for decades said that it regards chemical weapons exactly the same as nuclear weapons and will respond in kind. Likely on Pyongyang. Kim and the NK generals know this.

For the Polish scenario, Russia has already taken both Ukraine (doing so would result in massive casualties) AND the Baltic states, something that would have already led to war. This is a huge advantage given to Russia to would be effectively impossible in the real world. It also assumes that Russia has effective logistics. I strongly question that assumption. Even assuming it could build up such an ability, it would allow NATO to also build up.

The airpower examples seem to miss real strategy. Yes, there would not be a lot of close air support at the start because the emphasis would be achieving air superiority and SEAD/DEAD missions. This would also strip away any air support for Russian/Chinese/NK forces. And I have to question how it modeled that since the US has spent decades and billions of dollars on that task.

In short, it's an interesting read but I don't think it presages what would happen in the real world.

[Navigator]

I do agree with many of your points. I don't see the North Koreans doing anything on their own. I do think that the Chinese will reinforce/supply them to start something at the same time as Taiwan as a way to put serious additional pressure on US/Japan. They probably think that at the worst, they can hold the US/allies to some kind of a stalemate on the Korean peninsula while they take Taiwan.

In the Poland game (which I have played), I don't think that Russia has the Baltics already at the start, even though that is what the writer said. The game starts with the Baltics on a different map. They don't last long, but they do tie up the Russians for a couple of turns.

And, as we have discussed before, the games, as well as current military thought, contain a lot of assumptions that cannot be proven or disproven until war comes.

IMHO, I think that we primarily have weapon systems that defense contractors want to sell to maximize profit, not necessarily what we should have.

Also, the aggressor in any war generally has "surprises" in store for the other side that we don't know about. In WW1, these were the Big Berthas (and similar) that knocked out Belgian and French fortifications. In WW2, it was the German Panzer Division, which was FAR more effective than anyone could have imagined (Germans included) and the Japanese Kido Butai (concentration of all their carriers into a single battlegroup) and the Zero fighter. Something(s) similar are bound to come up when the shooting starts.

[London calling]

I do agree with many of your points. I don't see the North Koreans doing anything on their own. I do think that the Chinese will reinforce/supply them to start something at the same time as Taiwan as a way to put serious additional pressure on US/Japan. They probably think that at the worst, they can hold the US/allies to some kind of a stalemate on the Korean peninsula while they take Taiwan.

In the Poland game (which I have played), I don't think that Russia has the Baltics already at the start, even though that is what the writer said. The game starts with the Baltics on a different map. They don't last long, but they do tie up the Russians for a couple of turns.

And, as we have discussed before, the games, as well as current military thought, contain a lot of assumptions that cannot be proven or disproven until war comes.

IMHO, I think that we primarily have weapon systems that defense contractors want to sell to maximize profit, not necessarily what we should have.

Also, the aggressor in any war generally has "surprises" in store for the other side that we don't know about. In WW1, these were the Big Berthas (and similar) that knocked out Belgian and French fortifications. In WW2, it was the German Panzer Division, which was FAR more effective than anyone could have imagined (Germans included) and the Japanese Kido Butai (concentration of all their carriers into a single battlegroup) and the Zero fighter. Something(s) similar are bound to come up when the shooting starts.

Attack is the best form of defence. Let's invade Russia. Catch them by surprise.

A rogue bomber piloted by Slim Pickens is on its way now.

[Guest]

I do agree with many of your points. I don't see the North Koreans doing anything on their own. I do think that the Chinese will reinforce/supply them to start something at the same time as Taiwan as a way to put serious additional pressure on US/Japan. They probably think that at the worst, they can hold the US/allies to some kind of a stalemate on the Korean peninsula while they take Taiwan.

In the Poland game (which I have played), I don't think that Russia has the Baltics already at the start, even though that is what the writer said. The game starts with the Baltics on a different map. They don't last long, but they do tie up the Russians for a couple of turns.

And, as we have discussed before, the games, as well as current military thought, contain a lot of assumptions that cannot be proven or disproven until war comes.

IMHO, I think that we primarily have weapon systems that defense contractors want to sell to maximize profit, not necessarily what we should have.

Also, the aggressor in any war generally has "surprises" in store for the other side that we don't know about. In WW1, these were the Big Berthas (and similar) that knocked out Belgian and French fortifications. In WW2, it was the German Panzer Division, which was FAR more effective than anyone could have imagined (Germans included) and the Japanese Kido Butai (concentration of all their carriers into a single battlegroup) and the Zero fighter. Something(s) similar are bound to come up when the shooting starts.

Attack is the best form of defence. Let's invade Russia. Catch them by surprise.

A rogue bomber piloted by Slim Pickens is on its way now.

Only the Ukraine government and the US have consistently said Russia wants to invade Ukraine and I see no reason why we should believe either.

[Am Donut]

I do agree with many of your points. I don't see the North Koreans doing anything on their own. I do think that the Chinese will reinforce/supply them to start something at the same time as Taiwan as a way to put serious additional pressure on US/Japan. They probably think that at the worst, they can hold the US/allies to some kind of a stalemate on the Korean peninsula while they take Taiwan.

In the Poland game (which I have played), I don't think that Russia has the Baltics already at the start, even though that is what the writer said. The game starts with the Baltics on a different map. They don't last long, but they do tie up the Russians for a couple of turns.

And, as we have discussed before, the games, as well as current military thought, contain a lot of assumptions that cannot be proven or disproven until war comes.

IMHO, I think that we primarily have weapon systems that defense contractors want to sell to maximize profit, not necessarily what we should have.

Also, the aggressor in any war generally has "surprises" in store for the other side that we don't know about. In WW1, these were the Big Berthas (and similar) that knocked out Belgian and French fortifications. In WW2, it was the German Panzer Division, which was FAR more effective than anyone could have imagined (Germans included) and the Japanese Kido Butai (concentration of all their carriers into a single battlegroup) and the Zero fighter. Something(s) similar are bound to come up when the shooting starts.

Attack is the best form of defence. Let's invade Russia. Catch them by surprise.

A rogue bomber piloted by Slim Pickens is on its way now.

Only the Ukraine government and the US have consistently said Russia wants to invade Ukraine and I see no reason why we should believe either.

Troops massing on the border might be a clue.

[John]

** 11-Jan-2022 World View: Russian invasion

> Only the Ukraine government and the US have consistently said
> Russia wants to invade Ukraine and I see no reason why we should
> believe either.

All of Europe is concerned about a threatened Russian invasion of
Ukraine.

[Guest]

I posted this in another thread, but I think it may be of interest to most:

I am heavily involved with wargaming.

The following article is an in-depth look at what wargames (very complicated ones that have been proven time and again to be very prescient) say about upcoming war with China/Russia.

https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/how-d ... a-wargame/

Here are the key highlights I was sent by a NATO contact doing wargames with European military communities:

Marine Corps War College wargame I organized that allowed students to fight a multiple great state conflict last week. Run at a high level, clearly sponsored and with officers allowed the time to engage, and with an analytical strategic purpose. Also completed within a limited timeframe of a week – so achievable. It incorporates Russia in the Baltics/Ukraine/Poland, China using the opportunity to seize Taiwan and N Korea opportunistically attacking S Korea. A worst-case scenario for NATO and the West but not unrealistic in concept.

The wargames were played by six student teams, or approximately five persons each. There were three red teams, representing Russia, China, and North Korea; combatting three blue teams representing Taiwan, Indo-Pacific Command (Korea conflict) and European Command. Manageable resourcing if the outputs were agreed as adding value to strategic thinking, consideration of capability development and operating at reach with allies. Useful for developing some detailed Red forces thinking too that is based on real world nations rather than fabricated ones that resemble the actual potential adversaries.

Students were given a list of approximately 75 items they could invest in that would give them certain advantages during the game. A fascinating consideration to apply to current and future capability. Interesting that none of the students opted for an additional carrier!

As there was not enough American combat power to fight and win three simultaneous major conflicts, hard strategic choices were unavoidable. The article only really addresses US considerations, although clearly it is a global issue.

The fight in Poland was beyond brutal. By student estimates, the NATO forces lost over 60,000 men and women on the first day (150k in first week) of the fight, Sobering!

These games were designed to help the students think about future conflicts and operational art, and not for serious analytical work. Still, there were several observations that may point the services and Joint Staff toward areas that require more serious analysis. Sets the scope but illustrates that more may be gleaned from it.

The high rate of loss in modern conventional combat challenged student paradigms ingrained by nearly two decades of counter-insurgency operations. For students, who have spent their entire military lives viewing the loss of a squad or a platoon as a military catastrophe, this led to a lot of discussion about what it would take to lead and inspire a force that is burning through multiple brigades a day, as well as a lengthy discussion on how long such combat intensity could be sustained.

To ease the students into the complexity of this wargame, logistics was hugely simplified. Still, much of the post-game discussion focused on the impossibility of the U.S. military’s current infrastructure to support even half the forces in theater or to maintain the intensity of combat implied by the wargame as necessary to achieve victory.

Airpower, the few times it was available, was a decisive advantage on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the planes rarely showed up to assist the ground war, as they prioritized winning dominance of their own domain over any other task. Its about integration in combined and joint operations. Valuable lessons to be drawn from this. Also worth noting is how the very expensive carriers were kept away from threat and would only operate lose to shore when under an overwhelming land based air umbrella.

Neither America nor its allies had any adequate response to the use of chemical weapons by the enemy.

Neither U.S. forces nor allied forces had an answer to counter the overpowering impact of huge enemy fire complexes. I ran a wargame last Feb looking at doctrine and survivability on the modern battlefield set in Estonia against a near-peer enemy. IN both attack and defence, the NATO combat brigades were found by UAVs and written down 50% plus without ever seeing the enemy. They refused to believe the outcomes “because we’re so well trained!” or the “this wouldn’t happen” delusion. We have a lot to learn about near-peer conflict after 20+ years of Iraq and AFG.

Cyber advantages always proved fleeting. Moreover, any cyberattack launched on its own was close to useless.

For those interested, the games used are all part of GMT’s Next War Series, designed by Mitchell Land and Greg Billingsley. I have found these commercial games are far more sophisticated and truer to what we expect future combat to look like than anything being used by most of the Department of Defense’s wargaming community which is often decades behind commercial game publishers when it comes to designing realistic games. In fact, if I was to fault the Next War series for anything, it is that it may be overly realistic and therefore very complex and difficult to master, and time consuming to play.

Remember also that 6 weeks ago it was the threat of freezing weather causing havoc on the energy grid that Putin was making to get the pipeline approved.

Poland has seen mild weather.

Here in northern Europe it barely goes blow freezing at night.

Its has been mild so far....and winter is half over.

Has General winter changed sides?