Generational Dynamics World View News

[DaKardii]

If the global financial system breaks into two, the powers that be in Washington will want the heads of the countries responsible on a silver platter. And in their rage they may well succeed in pushing into China's camp not just Russia, but India as well.

TPTB in Washington are more globalists than nationalist.

Not when circumstances require them to resort to nationalism in order to keep their power.

[thomasglee]

If the global financial system breaks into two, the powers that be in Washington will want the heads of the countries responsible on a silver platter. And in their rage they may well succeed in pushing into China's camp not just Russia, but India as well.

TPTB in Washington are more globalists than nationalist.

Not when circumstances require them to resort to nationalism in order to keep their power.

If that what you want to believe - ok.

[DaKardii]

TPTB in Washington are more globalists than nationalist.

Not when circumstances require them to resort to nationalism in order to keep their power.

If that what you want to believe - ok.

The so-called "globalist" international system is dominated by Western elites. Eastern elites have only limited power relative to their Western counterparts. But non-Western civilizations such as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the Islamic world are increasingly rejecting this system, and setting up alternatives which would not just curb the power of the Western elites, but also potentially destroy it. The Western elites will become increasingly paranoid about these developments over time, and when they do they will unleash their inner xenophobes.

[Tom Mazanec]

Last Update March 18, 2022 06:18am EST
Lviv airstrike damages buildings near airport in western Ukraine: LIVE UPDATES
https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/ukrai ... 03-18-2022

Putin's chilling warning to Russian 'traitors' and 'scum' is a sign things aren't going to plan
Analysis by Angela Dewan, CNN
Updated 7:22 PM ET, Thu March 17, 2022
https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/17/europe/p ... index.html

[Guest]

This morning, in the section Poland-Belarus PSGKuźnica, four groups of illegals crossed the border, 23 foreigners were detained: from Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Syria. This month there have already been 624 attempts to illegally enter the territory from a distance.

According to reports, Russia is using the war in Ukraine to flood the West with more 3rd world migrants from as far away as Zimbabwe and the Congo.

[thomasglee]

This morning, in the section Poland-Belarus PSGKuźnica, four groups of illegals crossed the border, 23 foreigners were detained: from Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Syria. This month there have already been 624 attempts to illegally enter the territory from a distance.

According to reports, Russia is using the war in Ukraine to flood the West with more 3rd world migrants from as far away as Zimbabwe and the Congo.

Russia is? Seems to me the west did a much better job of flooding Europe just a few months ago.

[thomasglee]

Not when circumstances require them to resort to nationalism in order to keep their power.

If that what you want to believe - ok.

The so-called "globalist" international system is dominated by Western elites. Eastern elites have only limited power relative to their Western counterparts. But non-Western civilizations such as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the Islamic world are increasingly rejecting this system, and setting up alternatives which would not just curb the power of the Western elites, but also potentially destroy it. The Western elites will become increasingly paranoid about these developments over time, and when they do they will unleash their inner xenophobes.

OK, then "western" globalists.... However, you're overlooking how dependent the west is on the Chinese economy and money.

[utahbob]

Here is a short read on why the Russian forces are doing so poorly from a different POV that is not discussed very often: https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/ ... 2572854278

[utahbob]

This Tom Cooper’s brief and is interesting that it validates what is said here about the Russians in Syria.
Here just a short review of most important events of the last 24 hours (17 Mar 22), before I continue with my analysis of the air war over Ukraine in the first three weeks of this conflict.
CAA - Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG - Battalion Tactical Group (Russia)
GMRD - Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA - Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD - Guards Tank Division (Russia)
IFV - infantry fighting vehicle
LOC - Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass region)
MANPAD – man-protable air defence system
MBT - main battle tank
MRB - Motorized Rifle Brigade
MRD - Motorized Rifle Division
PGM – precision guided munition
RFA – Russian Federation Army/Russian Armed Forces
RF-9xxxx - Russian military aviation registration
SAM – surface-to-air missile
UAF – Ukrainian armed Forces
UCAV – unmanned combat aerial vehicle
VDV - Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (Russian Airborne forces)
VKS - Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space Force, Russia)
West OSK – Western Military District, RFA
A note for the start: Ironically, I’ve announced I’ll slow down, yesterday – and the Ukrainian MOD promptly ceased providing details about developments on the battlefield. I understand this as, 'they have good reasons why'.
‘Is OK, don’t worry’: there are more than enough other sources to get info from, and then cross-check. Actually, I hardly used anything from the Ukrainian MOD so far - except for orientation purposes. Plus – except one is directly involved, or has friends and/or relatives there - there wasn’t that much going on on battlefields of Ukraine War, yesterday.
For example, in the Kyiv area there was only sporadic shelling and rocketing. Sure, tragically, this has caused additional civilian casualties. Similar is valid for Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Further south-east, it turned out the Ukrainians have recovered the southern side of Izium, two-three days ago: the 144th MRD has attempted to capture the same, yesterday, but was ambushed and lost a number of vehicles (yes, 'once again').
At least in theory, more important is a report along which the Ukrainians have hit the field HQ of the 35th CAA, north-west of Kyiv, yesterday. This remains unconfirmed as of right now, but if they have delivered such a blow, it might prompt another, days-long delay in further Russian offensive operations in this part of Ukraine.
In the Luhansk area, the Russians are claiming to have captured Rubizhne: actually, they did reach the northern outskirts, before running out of steam: too few troops to run a bigger assault. For similar reasons, also the attacks on Sieveierodonetsk and Popasna remained unsuccessful.
In Mariupol, there is bitter house-to-house fighting in the western centre of the city. The only thing I’m sure by now is that, in the East, the 150th MRD suffered heavy losses and was stopped while advancing along the M14 highway in between the Kalmiusky District in the North, and Livoberezhnyi District in the south. Two days ago, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and Separatists have run that attack from West in direction of the Freedom Square, but were cut to pieces: word is the Separatists have lost another of their commanders: I just couldn’t find out his name. Of course, the city is all the time plastered by air strikes and artillery.
If there are really ‘news’, then from the battlefields in the south, and then the western bank of Dnepr, in the Mykolaiv area. Before I go on in this regards, please mind: in cases of wars like this one, I'm regularly about 2-6 days ahead of the mainstream media (so much so, the following segment was originally written already two days ago). Thus, don't be surprised if you now get to hear something that wasn't reported anywhere else.
Namely, regardless what are all the possible maps published on the TV and the internet shown, since two days the 58th CAA is on full withdrawal back to Kherson. Realising the Russians have no troops to launch an amphibious landing on Odessa, the Ukrainians brought in their 28th Mechanised Brigade and, pushing south from Mykolaiv, liberated Posad-Pokrovske on the M14 highway (that’s only some 40km outside Kherson).
About 200km further north, the Ukrainians have liberated Mala Shestirnya (also on the western bank of Dnepr, but south of Kryvyi Rih), too. Think, whoever is in command of the 58th CAA, might now want to pull back all of his troops and concentrate on defending Kherson - which is going to be a big trouble alone because of constant unrest and protests by the population inside (which are going on for two weeks, meanwhile).
BTW, Ukrainian Su-24s and Su-25s flew at least eight combat sorties in support of the counter-offensive of their ground forces along the M14, yesterday.
***
Which is bringing me to the...
Air War over Ukraine, Part 3
Before I go on into specific other details: chat with a Syrian contact, yesterday evening, reminded me of an important experience with Russians in the war there, back from 2015-2018.
Actually, it’s an extremely bad idea to mark buildings with Red Crosses and words like ‘Children’ when fighting a war with them.
In Syria of September 2015, the insurgents have – via the White Helmets and the UN – informed the Russian HQ at Hmeymim AB about every single of hospitals in areas held by them. They have provided precise coordinates, expecting the VKS to avoid these.
The Russians bombed every single of hospitals in question, and then launched a smear campaign against the White Helmets, declaring them for ‘jihadists’.
When the insurgents began hiding their hospitals, the Russians somehow got coordinates for these (probably bribed somebody at the UN), and bombed them too. Without exception.
…and, hand on heart, pilots are so busy flying their jets at 900km/h (+) without colliding with the ground, they’ve got no time to ‘read’ what’s written on or around some building: they have got their coordinates from superior commanders, are following orders and are bombing these.
Thus, my recommendation for Ukrainians: do not clearly mark your hospitals, ambulances, kindergartens or public shelters. HIDE THEM.
****
Having cleared that, now let’s see what is the Ukrainian Air Force Doing the last three weeks.
The Ukrainian Air Force has no such ‘force multipliers’ like A-50s, and even if: due to their size and slow speed, these would be ‘targets No.1’ for the VKS and thus far too vulnerable to operate. Indeed, even Ukrainian ground-based radars are only capable of operating for limited periods of time (say: 60-120 seconds at time): then they have to turn off in order to conceal their position.
Why that?
Early warning/surveillance radars are powerful systems, emitting huge amounts of electromagnetic energy. Their work is thus easily detected by modern-day sensors - as used by all armed forces for so-called ELINT-purposes (stands for 'Electronic Intelligence'). Unsurprisingly, the effect of powering up one of them on a modern battlefield can best be compared with turning on a hand-held lamp on a darkened football stadium by night: the holder of the lamp can only see what the lamp enlightens, but everybody – even in the rearmost corner of that stadium – can see the position of the lamp-holder. At least as long as the lamp is on…
Thus, better to turn the lamp on for only very short periods of time, and always change position immediately after. This comes at the price of the Ukrainians having a very poor ‘radar picture’ of their airspace, and – probably – depending on reports about visual observations instead. The latter is a well-proven, ages-old practice, but lately severely curtailed by massive, low clouds hanging over Ukraine. In turn, clouds are something neither Ukrainian nor Russian pilots like to fly through: the mass of both is only poorly trained in operations in adverse weather.
In regards of flight operations… As reported already several times, late in the evening of 23 February, the Ukrainian Air Force has quickly evacuated all of air bases in northern and eastern parts of the country. Around 22.00hrs that evening, one could track that evacuation even on the FlightRadar24.com, because numerous of involved transports and helicopters had their transponders activated.
Ever since, combat aircraft and helicopters are well-dispersed and -concealed, while many of transports were flown out of the country. This is why the Ukrainian fleet of aircraft and helicopters survived the first two days of the Russian onslaught in a relatively ‘intact’ condition.
Meanwhile, UkAF’s primary problems are communication and maintenance. Yes, types like MiG-29, Su-25 and Su-27 are made for ‘rough field’ operations, and can operate from grass strips, if necessary. But, maintaining them under such conditions is anything than easy: maintenance requires cleanliness and tools, and maintaining these two factors, literally ‘in the field’, is not easy. Their next problem is fuel: the Russians are continuously targeting fuel depots of major Ukrainian air bases with their ballistic missiles.
If the fuel is destroyed, it’s not available. Even if it is ‘just’ contaminated, its use can necessitate a complete engine removal.
That’s no ‘fun’ under field conditions…
…and then the air-to-air missiles – especially the medium-ranged R-27 (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AA-10 Alamo’) - are renowned for ‘not liking’ being roughly handled: due to resulting vibrations, any take-off or landing on a grass runway is near-certain to ruin all the rounds carried by the jet. Under the given conditions, at the time the UkAF is surely going to experience massive problems while trying to maintain and/or repair its stocks of air-to-air missiles, this means, ‘once and forever’.
Now comes that with communications: because it usually takes long for the HQ to figure out where are potential targets and what aircraft are available where, the UkAF is operating only against targets it can be sure are going to remain within a specific zone for long enough. Then the Su-24s, or, and more often, Su-25s are directed into strikes on RFA’s ground units. Mind: they operate with a bare minimum of intelligence about the strength and disposition of the Russian air defence. Unsurprisingly, and as should be meanwhile clear, involved crews are exposing themselves to the full power of the Russian arsenal and most of their sorties are either intercepted by VKS’ Su-27s, Su-30s, and Su-35s, or by ground-based air defences. Consequence are very heavy losses.
MiG-29s (the photo is shown an Ukrainian example with obvious traces of ‘field repairs’ to patch up all the shrapnel damage from a near-miss by some Russian missile on the fin) and Su-27s are used for interception only, and only if there is a ‘good opportunity’, and then armed with R-27s. Why that? The Russians are not even trying to engage them in dogfights, but firing their own R-27s and – slightly shorter-ranged, but active-radar-homing R-77s (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AA-12 Adder’) - from near-maximum range. Why taking risk to get shot down by one of nearly ineffective Ukrainian interceptors, if one can smack them from stand-off range….? Correspondingly, Ukrainians need ‘speed’ and ‘range’, not ‘manoeuvrability’.
One thing the UkAF MiG-29- and Su-27-pilots tried earlier during the war was to target the VKS aircraft with R-27ETs. Mind that for combat jets, activating radar is similar like that with early warning/surveillance radars, i.e. hand-held lamp on a darkened stadium by night. Thus, pilots are usually trying to approach their opponent without turning their radars on. The R-27ET is the infr-ared homing variant of this missile system, which means that – contrary to the R-27ER semi-active radar-homing variant – it requires no radar to be activated: it can be aimed and fired with help of the MiG-29’s and Su-27’s electro-optical targeting system.
Problem: R-27ET’s seeker head is dated (from the early 1980s) and has a relatively short acquisition range. Several UkAF MiGs and Sukhois have been shot down by Russian interceptors while trying to cut the range and deploy their R-27ETs.
(In this regards, the Ukrainians are now going through almost the same experience like Indian Su-30MKI-crews when trying to combat Pakistani F-16s and JF-17s during clashes back in February 2019: the sole difference is that – thanks to far better (and more intensive) tactical training, and superior situational awareness, and regardless of all the Pakistani- (and some US-) science fiction – the Indians lost none of their Su-30MKIs: by now it’s certain that the Ukrainians lost at least four of their MiG-29- and Su-27-pilots killed. )
Finally, Ukrainians are facing the threat of such Russian long-range surface-to-air missile systems like S-400 (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SA-21 Growler’): word is that one is deployed only about 100km north of Kyiv, just few kilometres inside Belarus. Like Ukrainian S-300s are keeping Russian reconnaissance aircraft at bay, the presence of Russian S-400s is forcing the UkAF to fly low (so to avoid early detection by the Russian radars – including those of A-50s), where its jets are vulnerable even to small-arms fire.
Sometimes, this is not possible: its jets have to ‘jink’ upwards, to target higher-flying Russians. That in turn exposed them to S-400s, and word is that two or three have been shot down by S-400s: one, reportedly, from no less than 125km range.
That’s the ‘essence’ of this air war, and in this regards, I do not expect a lot to change, regardless how long it might go on. Additional details – including Turkish-made Bayraktar TB.2s – are going to be discussed in the Part 4.

[Navigator]

Here is a short read on why the Russian forces are doing so poorly from a different POV that is not discussed very often: https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/ ... 2572854278

Excellent post Utahbob! Same for the extremely insightful situation reports! Please keep it up.